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ANITA LIPTON WARNER, Respondent, v. THOMAS
WILLIAM WARNER, JR., Appellant.
[1~

Divorce-OouDsel Fees and Ooats-Purpose of Allowance.Civ. Code, § 137, providing that durint, the pendency of an
action for divorce or separate maintenance the court may,
in its discretion, require either party to pay as eosts of
aetion or as attorney's ~ees any money necessary for the
prosecution of the IiCtion, is designed to enable the wife to
secure adequate representation to prosecute or defend the suit
and to meet the legal "xpenses and fees that she can reasonably
be expected to incur in that prosecution or defense.
[2] Id.-Oounael Fees and ')oats-Allowance for Past Semces.The allowance of attorney's fees under Civ. Code, § 137, :a
.limited to those eseential to the prosecution or defense of an
action for divorce or separate maintenance, and is neceSBarily
prospective in nature. That section does not authorize the
court to base an award on past services.
[8] Id.-Oounsel Fees and Costs-Oircumstances Meeting Right
to Allowance.-In making an award for attorney's fees pending an action for divorce or separate maintenance, the court
must take into account the extent to which the action may
be coutested, the size of the marital estate, and the difficulties
attending a determination of the value of the property and
its claseiHcation as separate and community. The award is
based on the value o~ the services that can thus be anticipated.
[4J Id.-Oounsel Fees and Oosts-Nature of Award.-An award of
attorney's fees pending an action for divorce or separate
maintenance is not f. retainer, which is a payment for undertaking the responsibility '. -: the representation bearing no relation to the value of the services that can be anticipakd and
payable even though no services are actually rendered.
[5J Id.-Counael Fees and IJClsts-Oircumstances Meeting Right
to Allowance.- -The possibility that contingencies might occur
that would make the anticipated legcl services unnecessary
pending an action for divorce or separate maintenance does not
preclude the court from making an allowance for attorney's
fees in the first instance.
[1] See 1 OaLJur. 989; 17 Am.Jur. 448.
[2] See 1 Oal.Jur. 998; 17 Am.Jur. 449.
Kelt. Dig. Beferences: [1] 'ivorce, § 176; [2] Divorce, § 189;
[3,5] Divorce, §l80; [4) Divorce, 1191; [6) Divorce, §l91(4);
[7] Divorce, 1188.
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[6] id.-Oounsel Fees and Oosta-ModL1cation of Order -After
an award of attorney's fees has been made pending an action
for divorce or separate maintenance, the trial court retains
jurisdiction to modify the award at any time during the
pendency of the action when r: chan6'e of circum stan -es occurs
that alters the extent of the services required, and should any
of the contingencie3 occur that would preclude rendition of
the anticipated services, the trial court could reduce the award
to an amount necessary to compensate the attorney for services
actually rendered.
[7] Id.~Oounsel Fees and Oosta-Amount of Allowance.-An
award of $10,000 counsel fees to the wife's counsel, pending
an action for separate maintenance, was not an abuse of
discretion where the trial court was justified in eoncluding
that the husband's assets were extensive and valuable, that
the wife's attorneys would find it exceptionally difficult to
locate and appr ise those assets, and that the husband would
do his utmost to hinder their search.

APPEAL from part of an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County awarding attorney's fees pendent lite.
Stanley Mosk, Judge. Affirmed.
Manuel Ruiz, Jr., Fink, Rolston, Levinthal & Kent and
Nelson Rosen for Appellant.
Gold & Needleman, J. George Gold, James J. Needleman,
Pacht, Warne, Ross & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht and Bernard
Reich for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought an action for separate
maintenance. After a hearing on an order to show cause, the
trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $500 per month
temporary alimony, to give her the occupancy of the 22-room
family home, and "to pay the attorney for the plaintiff
$10,000.00, $2500.00 on August 25, 1948, September 25, 1948,
October 25, 1948 and November 25, 1948. It is stipulated that
balance of attorney fees be fixed at time of trial." Defendant
appeals from that part of the order relating to the allowance
of attorney's fees pendente lite.
Defendant does not dispute that the allowance of alimony
or attorney's fees pendente lite under Civil Code, section 137.
and the amount thereof, are questions for the discretion of
the trial court, and that its order will not be set aside on appeal
unless there is clear evidence that there has been an abuse
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of discretion. (Come1l v. Comey, 8 Ca1.2d 453 [66 P.2d 148; i
Sword v. Sword, 3 Cal.2d 266, 268-269 [44 P.2d 315] ; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 418 [170 P.2d 670}; Stewart
v. Stewart, 156 Cal. 651, 655 1105 P. 955] ; Furniss v. Furniss, 1
75 Cal.App.2d 138, 141[170 P.2d 436] ; Busch v. Busch, 99 !
Cal.App. 198, 201-202 [278 P. 456].) He does not question
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied findings
of the trial court that he is financially able to pay the fees and
that his wife is not. (Mudd v. Mudd, 98 Cal. 320, 821 [33 P.
114] ; Westphal v. Westphal, 122 Cal.App. 38S, 390 [10 P.2d
122].) He contends only that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the payment of an amount that bears no
relation to services already performed but is based entirely
upon an estimate of the services that can be reasonably anticipated as necessary. He contends that a pendente lite award
of attorney's fees is in the nature of a retainer and that the
actual fees are to be fixed after the trial of the action, when
the trial court can determine the value of the legal services
actually rendered. In his view it is an abuse of discretion to
base an award upon an estimate of the value of the services
that may be anticipated, given the possibility that those services will not be rendered in the event of reconciliation or
death of one of the parties or death of counsel.
[1] Defendant's contention is based on a misconception
of the nature of pendente lite awards. Civil Code, section 137,
provides in part: CCDuring the pendency of any such action
[for divorce or separate maintenance] the court may, in its
discretion,require the husband or wife, as the case may be,
to pay as alimony or as costS of action or as attorney's fees
any money necessary for the prosecution of the action . . ."
The statute is designed to enable the wife to secure adequate
representation to prosecute or defend the suit and to meet the
legal expenses and fees that she can reasonably be expected to
incur in that prosecution or defense. [2] The allowance of
fees under section 137 is therefore limited to those essential to
such prosecution or defense and is necessarily prospective in
nature. Section 137 gives the court no authority to base an
award on past services. (Dixon v. D{xon, 216 Cal. 440, 443
[14 P.2d 497] ; Loveren v. Loveren, 100 Cal. 493, 495 [35 P.
87] ; Lacey v. Lacey, 108 Cal. 45, 46 [40 P. 1056] ; Stewart v.
Stewart, 32 Cal.App.2d 148, 150 [89 P.2d 404]; 1 Cal.Jur.
989,995,998; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 2]6, p. 912.)
[3] In making its award the trial court must take into
account the extent to which the action may be contested, the
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size of the marital estate, and the difficulties attending a determination of the value of the property and its classification as
separate and community. Its award is based upon the value
of the services that can thus be anticipated. (Sharon v. Sharon,
75 Cal. 1, 39 [16 P. 345] ; Schammcl v. Schammel, 74 Cal. 36,
38 [15 P. 364]; Brockmiller v. Brockml,"ller, 57 Cal.App.2J
623, 626 [135 P.2d 184] ; Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Cal.App.2d
148, 150 [89 P.2d 404] ; see, also, Stillman v. Stillman, 115
Misc. 106 [187 N.Y.S. 283, 289-390].) [4] It is not a retainer,
which is a payment for undertaking the responsibility of the
representation bearing no relation to the value of the services
that can be anticipated and payable even though no services
are actually rendered. (Knight v. RU8S, 77 Cal. 410,412, 413
[19 P. 698].) The trial court performed its statutory duty
in fixing the award according to the value of the services to
be anticipated.
Defendant relies upon a dictum of the District Court of
Appeal in Shapiro v. Shopiro (Cal.App.), 153 P.2d 62, 68
that supports his contention. This court granted a petition
for hearing in that case, but the appeal was subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Defendant recognizes
that the case is therefore of no value as precedent, but urges
that its reasoning is persuasive. We cannot agree. [5] The possibility that contingencies might occur that would make the
anticipated services unnecessary does not preclude the court
from making the allowance in the first instance. [6] After
a pendente lite award has been made, the trial court retains
jurisdiction to modify the award at any time during the
pendency of the action when a change of circumstances occurs
that alters the extent of the services required. "We entertain
no doubt of the power of the court in divorce actions to modify
its orders for the payment to the wife of money necessary to
enable her to support herself during the pendency of the
action, or to enable her to prosecute or defend the action, as
the circumstances with regard to necessity change." (Nightingale v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. 583 [194 P. 1002).} Should
any of the contingencies occur that would preclude rendition
of the anticipated services. the trial court could reduce the
award to an amount necessary to compensate the attorney for
services actually rendered. (Glcsby v. Glesby. 73 Cal.App.2d
301, 307 [166 P.2d 347J; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 87 Cal.
App.2d 643, 645 [197 P.2d 3591; Chester v. Chester, 76 Cal.
App.2d 265, 272 [172 P.2d 924].) St. Laurent v. St. Laurent,
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35 Cal.App.2d 345, 346 [95 P.2d 475], is not inconsistent withjl
this conclusion. The motion for modification in that case was ",~
not based on a change of circumstances but on a ground exist- '1,
: ing at the time the award was made that should have been ",
. raised on appeal from the order. The case is not authority for '~
. the proposition that a trial court cannot modify its award to ,,';
conform to a change of circumstances occurring during the
pendency of the action but after the time for appeal from
the order has expired.
'H
[7] There is ample evidence to support the determination
of the trial court that plaintiff's attorneys would be required {i\
to render services of the value of $10,000 in the course of :~
the pending action. Plainti1f testified that defendant had
threatened to inflict bodily harm on her, had taken her auto-I.',
mobile after she filed the action for separate maintenance, ~
and had several times informed her that she would never get •
anything from him if she sued for divorce because his attorney J
was "too smart for her" and had hidden his assets so that .1
'l}
she would never be able to locate them. Plaintiff's and defend- .~:;
ant's estimates of his annual income varied widely, but his .J
income tax returns sustained her substantially higher esti- ~
mate.. Plaintiff testified that her husband was· worth several ~~~
million dollars. He denied this, but a financial statement that
he submitted to the bank supported her estimate. There was
ample evidence that defendant had interests· of disputed value
in several business firms, both in California and Mexico. She
valued their family home at $225,000; he contended that it
was worth only $85,000. There was a dispute over defendant'8
ownership of stocks and bonds and of a manufacturing company. Plaintiff testified that her husband bad substantial
property and business interests in Mexico; he denied that he
had more than a few frozen assets of little value.
The trial court was justified in concluding that defendant's assets were extensive and valuable, that plaintiff's attorneys would find it exceptionally difficult to locate and appraise
those assets, and that defendant would do his utmost to hinder
their search. There was every indication that the trial of
plaintiff's action would be long and bitterly contested. In
view of these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in making the award. (Busch v. Busch, 99 Cal.
App. 198, 201-202 [278 P. 456] ; Schammel v. Schammel, 74
Cal. 36, 38 [15 P. 364].) Estate of Lundell, 95 Cal.App.2d
- - [212 P.2d 914], is not in point. In that case, an order
awarding $12,000 extraordinary attorney's fees was reversed
"
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for the reason that the trial court abused its discretion in
making the award without competent evidence to justify ita
conclusion that services of that value had been rendered.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and .Spence, J.,
concurred.

)

)

CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance and
generally in the reasoning of the majority, but I think it
proper to call attention to the recent decision of the District
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, in
the Estate of LundeU, 95 Cal.App.2d - ; [212 P.2d
914], a hearing in which ease was denied by this court on
February 23, 1950, as I think it is clear that the decision in
the last mentioned case is in clear conflict with the holding of
this court in the ease at bar as well as the settled rule in eases
of this character.
It has long been the rule in this state that in the allowance
of attorneys' fees, or the determination of the value of legal
services rendered by an attorney, the experience of the trial
judge furnishes every element necesRary to fix the value of
services rendered by an attorney in handling a legal problem
(Elconin v. Yalen, 208 Cal. 546 [282 P. 791]; City of Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms Co., 134 Cal.App. 268
[25 P.2d 224]; Theisen v. Keough, 115 Cal.App. 353 [1 P.2d
1015]; Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App. 658
[280 P. 1008]; Estate of SchneU, 82 Cal.App.2d 170 [185
P.2d 854]), and it is Dot necessary that expert evidence as
to the value of such services be introduced. (Estate of Straus,
144 Cal. 553 [77 P. 1122] ; Kendrick v. Gould, 51 Cal.App.
712 [197 P. 681] ; Reid v. Warren Improvement Co., 17 Cal.
App. 746 [121 P. 694]; Bowman v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
88 Cal.App. 481 [263 P. 826] ; Liebenguth v. Priester, 64 Cal.
App.2d 343 [148 P.2d 893] ; Ptebler v. Olds, 71 Cal.App.2d
382 [162 P.2d 953].) It also appeal'$ to be the settled rule
that even if expert evidence is offered in such a case, it is not
conclusive on the trial court. (Zimmer v. Kilborn, 165 Cal.
523 [132 P. 1026, Ann.Cas. 1914D 368] ; Spencer v. Collins,
156 Cal. 298 [104 P. 320, 20 Ann. Cas. 49] ; Lady v. Ruppe,
113 Cal.App. 606 [298 P. 859]; Cullinan v. McColgall. 87
Cal.App. 684 [263 P. 353] ; Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501 (261
P. 994] ; Nylund v. Madsen. 94 Cal.App. 441 r271 P 374] ;
Libby v. Kipp, 87 Cal.App. 538 [262 P.G8J ; Estate of Schnell,
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82 Cal.App.2d 170 [185 P.2d 854] ; Flynn v. Young, 25 Cal.
App.2d 614 [78 P.2d 245] ; MitcMU v. Towne, 31 CaJ.App.2d
259 [87 P.2d 908].)
In view of the rules of law announced in the authorities
. above cited, the decision of the District Court of Appeal in
the Estate of Lundell, supra, is clearly unsound, and this
court should have granted a hearing in that case in order to
maintain uniformity in the decisions on this subject.
In my opinion, the respondent's position in the Estate of
Lundell, supra, is much stronger and more in harmony with
the authorities on the subject than the position of respondcnt
in the case at bar, and it is impossible for me to reconcile the
position of the majority of this court in voting to deny
respondent's petition for a hearing in that case with their
position in joining in the opinion which affirms the order of
the trial court in the case at bar. The two positions are wholly
irreconcilable and the attempt in the majority opinion to distinguish the Estate of Lundell from the case at bar greatly
weakens the position of the majority and adds confusion to
the law in this field.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The complaint alleges that the
parties were married on January 14, 1946; that they separated
on July 28, 1948; and that there are no children of the marriage; the complaint was filed July 30, 1948; it further allegE's
that the extent of the community property is unknown but
that" Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief, alleges that the total value of Defendant's
separate property is in excess of $2,000,000.00." There was
a stipulation that "upon the trial of the case on the merits
the balance. if any, of counsf'l fees might be fixed."
Upon the above state of facts I am of the view that as a
matter of law it was an abuse of judicial discretion to order
$10,000 to be paid on account of attorneys' fees before trial
on the merits and largely in advance of the rendition of services of that value. There is no suggestion that there was any
necessity, nor do the facts of the present record reveal any
reasonable justification, for ordering payment of so large a
sum in advance of trial on the merits. At the trial it may
develop that under all the facts such a sum is grossly exorbitant, or fair, or quite inadequate; but requiring its payment
in advance and on the record as it now stands is essentially
speculative. As was well said by the District Court of Appeal
in its unanimous opinion (speaking through Mr. Justice

Mar. 1950] CEN'l'.
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Drapeau) modifying the order appealed from: "If death or
lerious injury should happen to counsel involved, the defendant may be called upon to pay additional fees for preparation
of plaintiff's case. There is the possibility of reconciliation
between the spouses. This frequently happens, and the law
is always hopeful that it may come to .pass. In the event of
an early reconciliation, obviously the fee named would be too
much. Then, too, there is the possibility of death of one of
the parties. Fees for legal services can be fixed by the trial
eourt which finally hears the case with better regard for the
rights of all parties concerned." (Wame,. v. Wamer (1949),
207 P .2d 622, 624.)

I would either modify the order by reducing the advance
payment, as did the District Court of Appeal, or reverse and
remand for further proceedings pendente lite.
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